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 ABSTRACT 
 
Research confirms that social networking is a significant predictor of firm financing in 
capitalist economies, but little is known about its effect in transition economies. This 
paper examines the role of market network ties in 3,263 firms in securing banks loans 
in China’s transition economy. The results demonstrate that social networking is a 
significant predictor of a firm’s success in securing loans. Surprisingly, it has the same 
positive impact on both state-owned and nonstate enterprises’ financing outcomes. 
These results suggest that social capital influences firms’ abilities to acquire financing 
regardless of ownership form in China’s transition economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A key question in economic sociology is how social structure affects financial markets 
(Uzzi 1999; Keister 2002; Light 2005; Stearns and Mizruchi 2005). The availability 
and cost of financing are important concerns for firms in competitive markets. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that social networking improves firms’ financial 
opportunities. Well-connected firms enjoy material and informational privileges which 
enhance their adaptability and survival (Podolny et al., 1996; Smith-Doerr and Powell 
2005). Furthermore, networking grounds firms within a field’s standards of 
acceptability and increases their legitimacy (Stuart et al., 1999). 
Most of the literature on the link between social ties and financing, however, is 
based on research conducted in capitalist economies. Little is known about the impact 
of firm embeddedness on finance in socialist or transition economies (Keister 2004). 
In socialist economies, political ties or hierarchical relations between the distributor of 
funds (the state) and the producer of goods (the state-owned enterprise) overshadow 
horizontal market ties (Nee 1989). Market transition theory suggests that economic 
transition will reduce the importance of political capital and increase the importance of 
market mechanisms (Nee 1989). As China transitions away from command economy 
and towards free markets, firms adopt standards that mirror those of Western firms. 
Market incentive structures induce competition, innovation, and growth. As the market 
increasingly pressures firms to be efficient and profitable, the financial impact of 
market R&D and interfirm ties may begin to overshadow the influence of political 
ties. This should be the case for both state-owned and private enterprises that are 
competing for financing. That said, the effects of embeddedness on financing 
outcomes are expected to be significantly less pronounced for state-owned enterprises 
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(SOEs) than nonstate enterprises due to the lingering effects of political capital within 
state-owned organizations. 
This paper begins by reviewing research on the importance of various kinds of 
market network connections for firm financing in capitalist economies. I then consider 
the importance of network connections from the standpoint of market transition 
theory, and discuss China’s transition economy as an important case study. I present 
an empirical analysis of the relationship between social capital and firm financing for 
both state-owned and nonstate enterprises in the context of China’s transition 
economy. Using data from the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey, I test the 
impact of firm networks on finance acquisition in China in 2002 and 2003. Results 
suggest that R&D and interfirm network ties translate into greater success in financial 
markets, in the same way that they do in free market economies. Moreover, the effects 
of this embeddedness on financing are robust across ownership forms. This suggests 
that state-owned enterprises are subject to the same expectations of the market which 
are applied to private firms. I close by discussing the importance of these results for 
existing theories on firm embeddedness, market transition, and financial markets.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
In financial markets, the borrower-lender relationship involves inherent information 
asymmetries (Leland and Pyle 1977; Campbell and Kracaw 1980; Diamond 1984). 
Banks attempt to minimize these asymmetries by collecting information about 
potential borrowers and assessing credit-worthiness (James and Wier 1990). Social 
capital is important in this context because it signals information about a firm’s 
investability to banks. In capitalist financial markets, the benefits to firms of social 
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capital or network embeddedness are well documented (Lincoln et al., 1992; Uzzi 
1999; Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005). The standard finding is that network ties 
improve the financial market’s evaluation of firms (Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005). 
Broadly speaking, network embeddedness increases firm performance and survival 
(Uzzi 1996; Stuart 2000). A closer look at specific types of ties (interfirm, R&D, and 
firm-bank ties) helps clarify the specific mechanisms linking network connectedness 
to firms’ abilities to acquire financing. 
 Interfirm ties serve as repositories of information and resources (Powell et al., 
1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Furthermore, they help cultivate mutual trust 
between firms, and increase perceived legitimacy to outsiders (Granovetter 1985; 
Powell et al., 1996; Stuart 2000; Rauch 2001; Cornwell and Harrison 2004; Smith-
Doerr and Powell 2005). A new venture’s exchange relationship with established 
organizations, for instance, signals organizational status to third parties (Stuart 2000). 
Well-connected, visible firms are kept informed by their allies and honest by their 
critics (Stuart et al., 1999). Signaling firm stability and access to resources, interfirm 
ties thus help reduce uncertainty over financing (Stuart et al., 1999). 
 The interlocking directorate is a common example of the interfirm tie (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Interlocking directorates demonstrate closeness to and 
cooperation with leaders of sister organizations. They are used by organizations to 
manage competition and uncertainty and to gain legitimacy. Research demonstrates 
that corporate profits are shaped not only by competitive market transactions but also 
by the strategic creation of directorate ties (Burt 1983). Other examples of interfirm 
ties include exchange relationships, contractual arrangements, and participation in 
business groups. 
 R&D ties similarly inform banks’ assessments of firms. These are relationships 
between organizations designed to exchange or develop new technologies (Stuart 
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1998). Examples of R&D ties include strategic technology alliances and contractual 
relationships with research institutions or universities. Participation in the R&D 
process increases firm innovativeness. Particularly in rapidly developing industries, 
firms exploit relations with universities, research institutions, and other firms (to 
include rival firms) in order to keep up with ever-changing technologies and stay 
competitive. Isolated firms cannot keep pace with rapid advancements, leaving them 
vulnerable to failure by being out-competed (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998). Firms 
active in R&D also have higher absorptive capacities—increased ability to absorb and 
exploit knowledge relevant to competitive survival (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). R&D 
ties situate firms in the locus of innovation, increasing their legitimacy and 
performance in evolving fields and competitive markets (Powell et al., 1996). 
Ties between firms and their banks also directly affect lending relations and 
financial outcomes. Firms that capitalize on the amount and duration of their banking 
ties enjoy increased access to and decreased costs of bank financing (Baker 1990; 
Petersen and Rajan 1994; Uzzi 1999). Research shows that organizations manipulate 
the quality and the quantity of market ties with investment banks in order to reduce 
dependence and increase relational power (Baker 1990). Strong ties with banks 
convey private information and establish trust, both of which can reduce the risks 
associated with loans (Ferrary 2003). Banks, through maintaining ongoing 
relationships with firms, refine their judgment of firm credit-worthiness (Lummer and 
McConnell 1989; Petersen and Rajan 1994). Increasing a firm’s quantity of bank ties 
induces competition among banks and provides ability to scan the market for 
competitive loan structures and rates (Baker 1990; Uzzi 1999). 
This paper’s focus is on the role networks have in acquiring loans. The general 
consensus is that social network embeddedness within free-market economies has 
positive effects on firms’ abilities to acquire financing. The benefits of social network 
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embeddedness within transition and socialist economies, however, have been scarcely 
examined. 
 
THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
Sociological research demonstrates that credit market networks function differently 
under different market settings (Granovetter 1993; Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001; 
Keister 2001; Keister 2004). For example, granting credit in primitive economies (i.e., 
peasant societies, open-air markets) hinges on interpersonal relations; enforcement of 
credit terms occurs through face-to-face interaction rather than legal institutions 
(Granovetter 1993). The Russian credit card market, lacking the impersonal 
enforcement mechanisms seen in American markets, hinges on interpersonal relations 
and trust (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001). The American credit card market, by contrast, 
replaces interpersonal relations with the formal institutions of guaranteed contracts, 
credit bureaus, cooperation between banks, and rational bookkeeping in order to 
enforce loan terms.   
 In centrally planned economies, money is channeled through the central 
government. Broadly speaking, political capital trumps social capital. The state 
prioritizes full employment, health and social services, and total output rather than 
productivity. Funds are distributed by grant rather than by loan. Soft budget 
constraints forgive poor management decisions and poor business practices (Walder 
1995; Kornai 2003). Financial incentive structures under socialist economies are 
hierarchical and political. Resources flow from the top down. Organizations do not 
rely on horizontal (interfirm or R&D) ties for resources and legitimacy; rather, they 
rely on vertical (governmental) ties (Nee 1989). In other words, the social mechanisms 
securing a firm’s access to financial capital in capitalist economies are not present in 
centrally planned economies. Firms in this context have little incentive to join business 
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organizations, establish relationships with research institutions, or share resources and 
information with other firms.  
 In transition economies, network ties increase in importance (Nee 1989; 
Keister 2004). Ties to the market begin to overshadow ties to the state (Nee 1989; Cao 
and Nee 2000). The market increasingly pressures firms, state-owned or otherwise, to 
be efficient and profitable. More funds are distributed by loan rather than by grant, 
through the market rather than government channels (Keister 2004). Budget 
constraints harden, and the market provides increasing incentives to establish various 
interfirm and R&D ties. In this context it is less clear what role forms of social 
capital—political or social—will play in helping firms secure financing.  
I extend existing finance theory of social capital to the case of market 
transition in China. Formally, I propose that social network embeddedness increases 
the ability of firms to acquire financing in early 21st century China.  
 
CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES  
The narrative of market transition with respect to financial markets is one of 
decreasing reliance on state grants and increasing reliance on private loans (Keister 
2004). Reflecting this shift is the funding structure of state-owned enterprises in 
particular. SOEs fill a certain niche in the Chinese economy. Prior to reform (1978), 
SOEs dominated China’s industries. Emphasis was on full employment and 
production quotas rather than efficiency and profitability. Through the reform period, 
performance, profitability, and innovation have all gained prominence in SOE 
incentive structures (Jefferson and Rawski 1994). This is due in no small part to the 
fact that funding to SOEs has gradually shifted from direct grants to loans, either from 
private firms or the state (Cull and Xu 2000). Firm borrowing from nonstate entities 
(e.g., private or foreign banks) has increasingly taken a more prominent role, but little 
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research has been done on how social factors influence these lending decisions 
(Keister 2002). 
 Progress notwithstanding, many factors have stunted the free market 
development of Chinese SOEs. Contrary to private enterprises, concerns of efficiency 
continue to share the spotlight with concerns of full employment, resource 
distribution, and social services to employees and the general population. SOE 
managers have been tasked with providing housing and social services for most of 
their employees as well as for a significant chunk of urban residents. Also stunting 
development is the relative softness of budget constraints, which reduces incentives to 
perform according to market standards (Jefferson and Rawski 1994; Kornai et al., 
2003). Soft budget constraints increase organizational survival at the expense of 
efficiency and profitability (Kornai et al., 2003). Nonstate enterprises, without the 
benefits of soft budget constraints, are forced to value their resources more highly and 
thus tend to be more efficient. I am not concerned with smaller government-owned 
organizations, such as township-village enterprises (TVEs), because the complexity of 
issues faced by SOEs does not extend to TVEs, collectives, and the like (Walder 
1995). 
 Compared with their contribution to the country’s economy, SOEs have 
received a disproportionate share of the country’s lending resources. By the mid- to 
late-1990s, SOEs were receiving some 70-80 percent of the nation’s credits, while 
contributing less than half of its industrial net asset growth (Steinfeld 2002, pp. 381). 
This is partly explained by banks’ preferences to lend to established organizations; 
startups present greater risks. However, it is also partly explained by the continued 
role of political capital in banks’ lending decisions. The state often imposes its will on 
bank lending decisions while simultaneously providing insufficient oversight of 
financial markets, particularly hindering private development of China’s financial 
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sector (Jefferson and Rawski 1994; Steinfeld 2002; Keister 2004). Resource 
misallocation, bad loans, and nonperforming debt have all flourished under this system 
(Jefferson 1998). Private banks enforce stricter budget constraints than bureaucrats on 
transition era SOEs. And by the late 1990s, banks were increasingly loaning to private 
firms rather than SOEs because the former proved to be better investments. SOEs had 
developed a reputation for not performing well on loans (Cull and Xu 2000). 
This leads to my second fundamental research question: Does the importance 
of social capital vary with ownership form? The answer to this question will inform us 
on the extent of SOE marketization in transitional China. There is a disconnect 
between free market interests and the interests of the government. Through 
maintaining control over SOEs, the government imposes its interests on them and, 
subsequently, assumes responsibility for their continued performance (Lin et al., 
1998). The importance of political ties is expected to linger longer for SOEs than for 
nonstate enterprises, because SOEs remain arms of the state. Conversely, I predict that 
social network embeddedness is less important for SOEs’ financing outcomes than it 
is for nonstate enterprises. 
 
In summary, early 21st Century China offers us the opportunity to test the 
growing importance of firms’ social network ties in a transition economy. There is 
preliminary evidence that social network embeddedness in transition China provides 
benefits similar to those in capitalist economies. For instance, participation in business 
groups in transition China (circa 1990) increases a firm’s financial performance and 
productivity; this happens through decreased transaction costs and increased 
information and resource flows (Keister 1998). My central thesis is that these ties in 
China should also: 1) enhance the ability to acquire information and resources; 2) 
enforce established and evolving field-level standards, ensuring that firm behavior will 
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not stray too far into untested, risky territory; and 3) signal quality and investability to 
banks. This is because R&D ties, university ties, and market ties all inform firms (and 
banks) about changing environments (Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005).  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
My focus is on assessing the importance of firm network ties on financing outcomes in 
the context of China’s transition economy. The data for the analysis come from the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey (ICS). This survey has addressed 
productivity, investment, innovation, product certification, market setting and 
competition, client and supplier relations, ownership form, networking, and 
employment in firms of 110 developing countries throughout the world. The data were 
collected through face-to-face interviews, according to a written questionnaire, with 
each firm’s senior manager and accountant or personnel manager. Two waves of the 
ICS were conducted in China, one in 2002 and the other in 2003. The first wave 
reached 1,548 firms, the second 2,400. However, no firms from the 2002 survey were 
included in the 2003 survey, making this a strictly cross-sectional dataset. 
The firms included in the survey were located in twenty-three cities across 
China, spanning nineteen of China’s thirty-three provincial-level regions.1 The ICS 
was designed to be representative of China’s main industrial sectors and regions of 
economic activity. Therefore, firms of many different types were included in the ICS, 
ranging from manufacturing firms specializing in electrical and electronic products to 
service firms engaged in accounting services to retail trade. Firm eligibility for 
                                                
1 The 23 cities were the following: Beijing, Benxi, Changhun, Changsha, Chengdu, 
Chongqing, Dalian, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Haerbin, Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Kunming, 
Lanzhou, Nanchang, Nanning, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wenzhou, Wuhan, Xian, 
and Zhengzhou. 
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participation was determined based on having at least a minimum number of 
employees (fifteen for service firms and twenty for manufacturing firms), being 
roughly proportionate in size to the other firms that fall under the same sector and 
province, and being categorized into one of nine broadly categorized sectors.2 
Additionally, the survey was designed so that one-third of the firms in each city were 
in service sectors and two-thirds were in manufacturing sectors. Under these 
constraints, the sampling technique was stratified random. For a more complete 
description of the data, see Cull and Xu (2005) or Nee and Opper (forthcoming). 
  
FINANCING MEASURE  
The dependent variable is dichotomous, measuring whether or not a firm had a loan 
from a financial institution when the survey was taken. It is possible that a firm had 
more than one loan from one or more financial institutions, but this survey only 
provides information on the presence of at least one loan, which is an appropriate 
measure of bank-determined investability. 
  
FIRM NETWORK EMBEDDEDNESS 
The key predictor variables focus on firm networking and ownership form. I include 
five measures of firm network ties. The first two capture interfirm ties: (1) Is the firm 
a member of a business association? (2) Does the firm have a contractual or 
longstanding relationship with other firms? These ties may signal legitimacy and 
access to information and resources from other firms. The third captures R&D ties: (3) 
                                                
2 The requirement of having at least fifteen or twenty employees was relaxed in cities 
where there were not enough eligible firms to complete the survey based on these 
criteria. The nine target sectors were the following: apparel and leather goods; 
electronic equipment; electronic components; consumer products; vehicle and vehicle 
components; information technology services; accounting, auditing, and non-banking 
financial services; advertising and marketing; and business logistics services. 
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Does the firm have a contractual or longstanding relationship with a local university or 
research institution? R&D ties, along with interfirm ties, enhance a firm’s ability to 
acquire information, an ability that is particularly important in rapidly changing 
environments (such as transition economies). The last two capture the embeddedness 
of firms within financial markets: (4) What is the duration (in years) of the firm’s 
relationship with its primary financial institution? (5) How many financial institutions 
does the firm do business with? Firm-bank ties establish trust and confidence between 
lender and borrower over time, and ties to multiple financial institutions increase a 
firm’s knowledge of and access to the credit market. Each of these five networking 
measures is considered separately in the analysis because there are different benefits 
for these different types of ties, and also because they do not scale together (α =0.08).3  
 
OWNERSHIP FORM 
The measure of ownership form is dichotomous, indicating whether or not the firm is 
legally registered as a state-owned enterprise. The interaction of this with the 
networking variables informs this paper on how the importance of networking varies 
with ownership form. One present hypothesis is that state ownership reduces the effect 
of networking on financial outcomes. Summary statistics for this and the other key 
variables in the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
 
COVARIATES 
Decades of research demonstrate the importance of basic firm characteristics on 
financial outcomes. I include the firm’s age (in years), average education of 
managerial personnel (measured as a single, ordinal variable), and size (average 
                                                
3 The two variables that scale the closest are R&D ties and interfirm ties, but the alpha 
reliability coefficient for these two is only 0.42. 
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number of employees). I include the debt-asset ratio to control for financial health 
(Baker 1990; Nee and Opper forthcoming) and the log of the firm’s sales change to  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Main Variables.       
Description mean S.D. N 
Dependent Variable       
   
.210 .407 3948 Has firm acquired a loan from a financial institution? 1= Yes, 0=No 
   
Networking Variables    
   
11.076 10.217 3817 Duration (in years) of relationship with main bank. Range: 0-60. 
   
   
3.126 4.109 3854 
Number of banks or financial institutions the firm does business with. 
Range: 0-200. 
   
   
.568 .495 3879 Is the firm a member of a business association? 1=Yes, 0=No. 
   
   
.163 .369 3852 
R&D ties: Does the firm have a contractual or longstanding 
relationship with a local university or research institute? 1=Yes, 
0=No    
   
.122 .328 3844 
Interfirm ties: Does the firm have a contractual or longstanding 
relationship with another firm? 1=Yes, 0=No 
   
Ownership Form    
   
.243 .429 3948 Is the firm a state-owned enterprise (SOE)? 1=Yes, 0=No 
   
Firm Characteristics    
   
14.036 14.686 3899 Age of firm. Range: 0-100 
   
   
568 2708 3896 Average number of employees. Range: 1-83542 
      
 
control for recent growth (Uzzi 1999). I control for whether or not the firm is located 
in an industrial park or export processing zone, because these zones carry certain legal 
and tax idiosyncrasies (Nee and Opper, “Political Connections in China’s Market 
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Economy”). To account for regional, legal, and competitive differences across 
contexts, I also include a set of 22 dummy variables representing the firm’s city and a 
set of 14 dummy variables representing the firm’s industry.4 Guangzhou is used as the 
reference city, and electrical and electronic products is the reference industry, as these 
categories contain the most observations.5 
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression models for 
the analysis. Equation 1 formalizes the initial model: 
                                              logit( )p X Y Z! " # $ %= + + + +             Eq. 1 
In this model, p is a binary variable indicating the absence or presence of bank 
financing. α is the intercept. X is the set of social networking variables, Y the variable 
for state ownership, and Z the set of covariates. β, γ and λ are the corresponding 
vectors of regression coefficients. Finally, ε is the vector of residuals.6 
 The first step of the analysis is to examine the behavior of state ownership and 
the control variables before including the social networking variables. This allows me 
                                                
4 By controlling for city we implicitly control for the wave of the survey, since no city 
appears in both waves. 
5 I ran a separate regression that includes the firm’s “acid ratio,” which is defined as 
assets minus inventories divided by liabilities. Details are given in the appendix.  
6 Data are available for most firms, but 685 firms are not included in the main analysis 
due to missing data. To ensure that sample selection was not a major problem, I 
carried out a supplementary set of analyses using a propensity score weighting 
technique described by Morgan and Todd (2008). This involves several steps. First, I 
created a dichotomous variable indicating whether a given firm was included in the 
final analysis. I then predicted this variable  using various firm-level characteristics, 
including state ownership and each of the dummy city variables. This provides a 
predicted probability that a given firm made it into the final analysis. I then reran the 
main regression analyses using the inverse of this predicted probability as an 
importance weight. This technique effectively weights more heavily those cases that 
were least likely to make it into the final analysis. With this technique, the results, 
which are available from the author upon request, remain unchanged. 
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to assess the importance of state ownership apart from social capital. Next, I add all of 
the social networking variables simultaneously, which allows me to assess the overall 
contribution of network connectedness to a firm’s ability to acquire financing. 
 The remaining steps of the analysis make it possible to examine if and how the 
importance of social networking varies with ownership form. To do this, I add the 
interaction between state ownership and each of the five social networking variables 
separately into the model. Equation 2 expands on Equation 1 by adding the 
appropriate interaction terms. 
                                        logit( )
i i
p X Y X Y Z! " # $ % &= + + + + +              Eq. 2 
In Equation 2, XiY is the interaction of the ith social networking variable with state 
ownership, and φi is the corresponding coefficient. The interactions of network 
connectedness with state ownership are taken sequentially rather than simultaneously 
to maximize the interpretability of the coefficients and to prevent multicollinearity. All 
regression analyses are restricted o those cases which have non-missing data on all of 
the variables used in the analysis (N=3,263). 
 
RESULTS 
 
There are early indications that a firm’s need for and access to market financing are 
not dominated by its ownership form. Of all firms in the data set, 828 firms (21.0%) 
had at least one loan from a financial institution. The zero-order difference in 
likelihood of an SOE having a loan as compared with a nonstate enterprise is 
nonsignificant (t = .92; p = 0.36). Specifically, of all SOEs, 191 (19.9%) had a loan, 
compared to 637 (21.3%) nonstate enterprises. 
 The network variables are well represented in our data. 2,205 of the firms 
(56.8%) belong to a business association. 626 (16.3%) have contractual or 
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longstanding relationships with local universities or research institutions. 470 (12.2%) 
have contractual or longstanding relationships with other firms. Firms have an average 
of 3.13 banks (s.d. = 4.11) and an average relationship of 11.07 years (s.d. = 10.22) 
with their primary bank. 
 The network embeddedness of SOEs is similar but not identical to that of non-
SOEs (see Figure 1). SOEs are about 9 percent more likely to be members of business 
associations (p < .001). SOEs are equally likely to have ties to local universities, to 
research institutions, and to other firms as are non-SOEs. SOEs are marginally more 
likely than non-SOEs to have more banks (p = .052). Finally, SOEs on average have a 
much longer relationship with their primary bank (16.8 years vs. 9.2 years, p < .001). 
This is to be expected since SOEs existed prior to the reform (1978), whereas nonstate 
enterprises were all founded after the reform.  
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  Preliminary evidence suggests that interfirm, R&D, and firm-bank ties all 
inform the lending process. Figure 2 shows that loan acquisition is much more 
common in firms that are members of business associations, have at least one R&D 
tie, and have at least on interfirm tie. Also, the size of a firm’s bank network is 
positively related to its loan acquisition. Firms that do not have a loan have, on 
average, 2.83 ties with banks, compared with an average of 4.21 for banks that have 
received a loan (t=-8.63, p<.001). Similarly firms that do not have a loan have, on 
average, a relationship with their main bank extending 10.76 years, compared with  
12.22 for banks that have received a loan (t=-3.65, p=.0001). 
 
 Table 2 presents the regression results, which examine the effects of 1) 
networking on loan acquisition, and 2) the interactions of networking and state 
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ownership on loan acquisition for 3,263 firms in our survey.7 As predicted, network 
embeddedness is a significant predictor of loan acquisition. Model 1 excludes 
interaction terms and social networking variables, providing a sense of how SOEs fare 
with respect to loan acquisition before considering their network connectedness. It is 
notable that ownership form is not a significant predictor of financing. This reaffirms 
that SOEs have as much need for and access to loans as nonstate enterprises. 
Model 2 adds the networking variables. The duration of a firm’s relationship 
with its main bank is the one embeddedness predictor which is not significantly 
associated with financing. This may be due to the rapidly changing banking 
environment in transition China. More will be said about this in the discussion. All 
other networking variables are significant in all models. The size of the firm’s bank 
network (firm-bank ties), having a relationship with a local university or research 
institution (R&D ties), being a member of a business association (interfirm ties), and 
having a contractual or longstanding relationship with other firms (interfirm ties) are 
significant, positive predictors of loan acquisition. This is strong evidence that social 
network embeddedness at the firm level informs the lending process, confirming this 
paper’s prediction as well as evidence from more capitalist economies. 
 Models 3-7 examine how each of the networking variables interacts with state 
ownership. Owing to the fact that all interactions are nonsignificant, each of these 
models tells us the same thing: The importance of social capital does not vary with  
ownership form. Some point estimates might ease the interpretation of these findings. 
                                                
7 The models include cases only for which there are data on all variables. A close look 
at the ICS data reveals an extreme case where a firm is recorded as having 200 banks. 
This is at least one order of magnitude larger than 99.8% of all other cases, and it is 
344% larger than the next largest case. Excluding this case from the basic social 
networking model (Model 2) changes Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
substantially—calculating with 10 groups, the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 changes from 
9.88 to 14.18 (43.5%), and the p-value changes from 0.273 to 0.077. Based on this 
point’s influence, I exclude it from all models. 
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Results (N=3,263).a 
          
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ownership Form        
-.165 -.237 -.147 .032 -.061 -.160 -.202 Is firm a state-owned 
enterprise SOE? (.120) (.123) (.182) (.188) (.195) (.136) (.130) 
Network Connectedness       
 -.005 -.002 -.004 -.005 -.005 -.005 Duration of relationship 
with main bank (years)  (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
        
 
   
.158*** 
   
.158*** 
   
.182*** 
   
.158***    .157***    .157*** Number of banks firm does business with 
 (.020) (.020) (.024) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
        
   .262**   .261**   .260**   .318**   .258**   .262** Is firm member of 
business association?  (.098) (.098) (.098) (.110) (.098) (.098) 
        
   .373**   .372**   .363**   .369**    .459***   .374** R&D ties 
 (.120) (.120) (.120) (.120) (.136) (.120) 
        
  .301*  .305*  .301*  .302*  .300*  .354* Interfirm ties 
 (.132) (.132) (.132) (.132) (.132) (.147) 
Interactions        
  -.006     SOE*firm-bank duration 
  (.009)     
   -.073    SOE*number of banks 
   (.039)    
    -.257   SOE*bus. assoc. 
membership     (.224)   
     -.343  SOE*R&D ties 
     (.260)  
      -.246 SOE*interfirm ties 
      (.305) 
Covariates        
  .010**  .009*  .009*  .009*  .009*  .009*  .009* Age of firm 
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
        
   
.390***  .268*  .273*  .270*  .268*  .268*  .266* 
Is firm located in 
industrial park or export 
processing zone? (.104) (.107) (.108) (.108) (.107) (.107) (.107) 
        
-9.897 -5.050 -5.099 -4.751 -5.092 -5.064 -5.060 Constant 
(18.642) (9.145) (9.112) (8.671) (9.031) (9.162) (9.157) 
a. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models control 
for the 
firms’ size, industrial sector, city, debt/asset ratio, sales change (log), and average 
education of 
managerial personnel.  
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The odds ratio of having a loan for an average firm that is not an SOE but that is 
maximally socially embedded (at least one R&D tie, one interfirm tie, and one 
membership a business group), assuming average firm-bank connectedness, is .69; the 
odds ratio for an equivalent SOE is statistically indistinguishable at .55. By 
comparison, the odds ratio of having a loan for an average firm that is not an SOE and 
that is minimally socially embedded with no R&D ties, interfirm ties, or memberships 
in business groups is .27; the log odds for an equivalent SOE is statistically 
indistinguishable at .21.  
To check the robustness of this finding, I included all interaction terms 
simultaneously in separate regressions. As expected, each interaction remained 
nonsignificant, and each social networking variable that was previously significant 
remained so (duration of relationship with main bank remained nonsignificant).8 This 
suggests that the evolving expectations for SOEs (e.g., performance incentives) have 
created an environment in which the importance of social capital on financing 
becomes as significant as it is to nonstate enterprises.  
   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The results above provide evidence that, as in developed capitalist economies, social 
network embeddedness has a significant positive relation with firm financing in 
China’s transition economy. This lends credence to market transition theory’s thesis 
that transition economies will see an increasing importance of market mechanisms 
(Nee 1989; Cao and Nee 2000). The positive effect of horizontal networking on 
financial outcomes demonstrates that the market rewards firms for associating with 
                                                
8 Specific values are available upon request to the author. 
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other firms. Theory permits us to propose the mechanisms involved in the relation 
between social capital and financing. Firms that develop associations with other firms 
reduce uncertainties and transaction costs. Interfirm ties increase a firm’s access to 
resources and information (Powell et al., 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), and they 
increase perceived legitimacy to external organizations (Stuart 2000). R&D ties 
increase a firm’s innovativeness (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998), learning capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), legitimacy and performance (Powell et al., 1996). 
Having multiple firm-bank ties induces competition among banks, informs firms on 
financial markets, and increases firm relational power (Baker 1990; Uzzi 1999). In 
China’s transition economy, each form of social tie informs the lending process. 
Taken together, social capital situates firms within organizational fields, increases the 
flow of information and resources, and signals investability to potential lenders. 
 Longevity of firm-bank ties in China does not prove to be as consistently 
beneficial. The one measure of network connectedness that turned out to be 
nonsignificant to finance acquisition was the duration of a firm’s relationship with its 
main bank. This is probably attributable to the relative newness of private banking in 
the Chinese economy. Whereas at one point the state bank distributed all funds, as the 
free market has taken shape, newly formed private banks have increasingly become 
the intermediaries between investors and loan recipients. As noted above, the Chinese 
state has been particularly resistant to the development of the country’s private 
financial sector. This has delayed the entry and growth of private banks. Longevity of 
firm-bank ties should gain importance as the financial sector develops. However, 
number of bank ties is robustly significant in all of our models. Firms are thus able to 
capitalize on multiple banking relationships to get financing. 
Contrary to expectations, network connectedness does not vary with ownership 
form. This means that social capital matters as much to SOEs as to nonstate 
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enterprises. Social capital cuts across ownership form in 21st century China. This is 
consistent with research that underscores the market pressures facing SOEs (Jefferson 
and Rawski 1994). State ownership does not exclude enterprises from competitive 
forces. Even though political capital functions prominently in the survival of SOEs, 
social network embeddedness remains positively relevant to loan acquisition. 
Previously dominated by political capital, SOEs under market transition become 
subject to the market mechanisms which apply to nonstate enterprises.   
 The findings of this paper confirm that social network embeddedness carries 
financial benefits to firms in early 21st century China and that these benefits extend 
across ownership form. The implications of this research are promising for social 
network analysts. This paper expands the scope social network theory to an additional 
institutional context: the transition economy. Less than three decades after the onset of 
reform, this formerly socialist economy is demonstrating the relevance of social ties to 
business transactions. Economic incentive structures are replicating those of more 
capitalist economies. 
What is unclear from this cross-sectional data is if the importance of social 
capital grows over time in transition markets. One of the central claims of market 
transition theory is that horizontal market ties will increasingly replace vertical 
political ties as an economy distances itself from socialism (Nee 1989). Future 
research with longitudinal data would inform the literature on the extent to which 
social capital increases in importance as a function of time away from socialist 
institutions. Longitudinal data would also tease out the direction of causality between 
social capital and acquisition of finance. 
 Another useful extension of these findings would be to apply the same theory 
of network embeddedness to other developing economies. Does embeddedness 
increase firm financing or, more generally, firm performance in contemporary Russia? 
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What about the Congo? Or Cuba? I suspect that social capital will have a positive 
effect on firm financing and performance in each of these countries through the same 
mechanisms discussed in this paper. Future research of this kind will broaden our 
understanding of social capital’s role in diverse market settings.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Research demonstrates the significance of a firm’s acid ratio in securing bank 
financing (Uzzi 1999). The acid ratio is defined as assets minus inventories divided by 
liabilities. Many firms in the ICS, due either to lack of knowledge or confidentiality 
concerns, did not provide complete information on assets, inventories, or liabilities. 
Thus, inclusion of this variable reduces the number of cases included in the analyses 
from 3262 to 2336 (a drop of 28.4%). This appendix repeats the analyses with acid 
ratio included. 
 As shown in Table A, all independent social capital variables (Models 2-7) 
other than contractual or longstanding ties with a local university or research 
institution (R&D ties) maintain their significance at the 0.05 level if they were 
significant before. R&D ties fall to marginal significance (p=0.053), which is probably 
a consequence of selection issues. All interaction effects of social capital and state 
ownership remain nonsignificant with the exception of state ownership interacting 
with number of banks. The significant negative interaction between state ownership 
and number of banks suggests that SOEs benefit less from having numerous bank ties. 
But due to the instability in China’s transition banking environment, this provides 
little concrete evidence without evidence of significant interactions with other 
embeddedness measures. Overall, including the acid ratio confirms the robustness of 
this paper’s findings that social network embeddedness positively affects firm loan 
acquisition in early 21st century transition China, and that this effect does not vary 
with ownership form. 
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Table A. Logistic Regressions with Acid Ratio (N=2,336).a 
        
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ownership Form        
-.176 -.261 -.024 .122 .000 -.239 -.237 Is firm a state-owned enterprise 
SOE?  (.143)  (.146)  (.222) (.219) (.242)  (.165)  (.156) 
Network Connectedness       
 -.005 .002 -.004 -.004 -.005 -.005 Duration of relationship with main 
bank (years)   (.007) (.008)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007) 
        
    .158***    .158***    .192***    .158***    .157***    .157*** Number of banks firm does 
business with  (.023) (.023) (.028) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
        
  .265*  .261*  .256*   .330**  .264*  .264* Is firm member of business 
association?  (.112) (.112) (.112) (.122) (.112) (.112) 
        
 .258 .255 .249 .255 .279 .259 R&D ties 
 (.134) (.134) (.134) (.134) (.152) (.134) 
        
   .424**   .428**   .425**   .420**   .423**   .456** Interfirm ties 
 (.149) (.149) (.149) (.149) (.149) (.166) 
Interactions        
  -.015     SOE*firm-bank duration 
   (.010)     
   -.099*    SOE*number of banks 
    (.043)    
    -.366   SOE*bus. assoc. membership 
     (.276)   
     -.083  SOE*R&D ties 
      (.290)  
      -.148 SOE*interfirm ties 
       (.341) 
Covariates        
-.047* -.042* -.042* -.041* -.042* -.042* -.042* Acid ratio 
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
 .008* .007 .006 .006 .007 .007 .007 Age of firm 
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
  .374**  .293*  .304*  .300*  .295*  .294*  .292* Is firm located in industrial park or 
export processing zone? (.115) (.118) (.119) (.119) (.118) (.118) (.118) 
-5.639 -4.591 -4.743 -4.354 -4.667 -4.592 -4.589 Constant 
 (8.373)  (7.818)  (7.815)  (7.533)  (7.748)  (7.817)  (7.816) 
a. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models control for the 
firm's size, industrial sector, city, debt/asset ratio, sales change (log), and average education of 
managerial personnel. 
 25 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Baker, Wayne. 1990. “Market Networks and Corporate Behavior.” American Journal  
of Sociology 96(3):589-625. 
Bourdieu, P. and L.J.D. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Burt, Ronald. 1983. Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market  
Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Campbell, Tim and William Kracaw. “Information Production, Market Signalling, and  
the Theory of Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance 35(4):863-82. 
Cao, Yang and Victor Nee. 2000. “Comment: Controversies and Evidence in the  
Market Transition Debate.” American Journal of Sociology 105(4):1175-89. 
Child, John and David K. Tse. 2001. “China’s Transition and Its Implications for  
International Business.” Journal of International Business Studies 32(1):5-21. 
Cohen, Wesley M. and Daniel A. Levinthal. 1990. “Absorptive Capacity: A New  
 Perspective on Learning and Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly 
 35:128-52. 
Collett, David. 2003. Modelling Binary Data, 2nd Edition. New York: Chapman &  
Hall. 
Cornwell, Benjamin and Jill Ann Harrison. 2004. “Union Members and Voluntary  
Associations: Membership Overlap as a Case of Organizational 
Embeddedness.” American Sociological Review 69(6):863-881. 
Cull, Robert and Lixin Colin Xu. 2000. “Bureaucrats, State Banks, and the Efficiency  
of Credit Allocation: The Experience of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises.”  
Journal of Comparative Economics 28:1-31. 
 26 
Cull, Robert and Lixin Colin Xu. 2005. “Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The 
 Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms.” Journal of  
Financial Economics 77:117-46. 
Diamond, Douglas. 1984. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.”  
Review of Economic Studies 51(3):393-414.  
DiMaggio, Paul and Walter Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional  
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American  
Sociological Review 48:147-60. 
Ferrary, Michel. 2003. “Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending  
Activities.” Journal of Socio-Economics 31(6):673-99. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
 Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510.  
Granovetter, Mark. 1993. “The Nature of Economic Relationships.” In Explorations in 
 Economic Sociology. Ed. by Richard Swedberg. New York: Russell Sage  
Foundation, pp. 3-41. 
Guseva, Alya and Akos Rona-Tas. 2001. “Uncertainty, Risk, and Trust: Russian and  
American Credit Card Markets Compared.” American Sociological Review 
66(5):623-46.  
Heiberger, Richard M. and Burt Holland. 2004. Statistical Analysis and Data Display.  
 New York: Springer. 
James, Christopher and Peggy Wier. 1990. “Borrowing Relationships, Intermediation,  
and the Cost of Issuing Public Securities.” Journal of Financial Economics 
28:149-71. 
Jefferson, Gary H. 1998. “China’s State Enterprises: Public Goods, Externalities, and  
 Coase.” American Economic Review 88(2):428-32. 
Jefferson, Gary H. and Thomas G. Rawski. 1994. “Enterprise Reform in Chinese  
 27 
 Industry.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8:47-70. 
Keister, Lisa A. 1998. “Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm  
 Performance in China’s Transition Economy.” American Journal of Sociology  
104(2):404-40. 
Keister, Lisa A. 2001. “Exchange Structures in Transition: A Longitudinal Study of  
 Lending and Trade Relations in Chinese Business Groups.” American  
Sociological Review 66:336-60. 
Keister, Lisa A. 2002. “Financial Markets, Money, and Banking.” Annual Review of  
 Sociology. 28:39-61. 
Keister, Lisa A. 2004. “Capital Structure in Transition: The Transformation of  
Financial Strategies in China’s Emerging Economy.” Organization Science 
15(2):145-158. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and  
Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 
Kornai, Janos; Eric Maskin; and Gerard Roland. 2003. “Understanding the Soft  
Budget Constraint.” Journal of Economic Literature 41:1095-1136. 
Leland, Hayne and David Pyle. 1977. “Informational Asymmetries, Financial  
Structure, and Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Finance 32:371-87.  
Light, Ivan. “The Ethnic Economy.” The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2nd ed.
 Smelser and Swedberg, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 650-77. 
Lin, Justin Yifu; Fang Cai; and Zhou Li. 1998. “Competition, Policy Burdens, and  
State-Owned Enterprise Reform.” American Economic Review 88(2):422-27. 
Lincoln, James R.; Michael L. Gerlach ; and Peggy Takahashi. 1992. “Keiretsu  
Networks in the Japanese Economy: A Dyad Analysis of Intercorporate Ties.”  
American Sociological Review 57:561-585. 
Lummer, Scott and John McConnell. 1989. “Further Evidence on the Bank Lending  
 28 
Process and the Capital-Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements.” Journal 
of Financial Economics 25:99-122.  
Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. The Free Press: Glencoe. 
Meyer, John and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal  
Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83:340-63. 
Meyer, John and W. Richard Scott. 1983. “Centralization and the Legitimacy  
Problems of Local Government.” Organizational Environments: Ritual and 
Rationality. 
Mizruchi, Mark and Linda Stearns. 1994. “A Longitudinal Study of Borrowing by  
Large American Corporations.” Administrative Science Quarterly 39:118-40.  
Mizruchi, Mark and Linda Stearns. 2001. “Getting Deals Done: The Use of Social  
Networks in Bank Decision-making.” American Sociological Review 
66(5):647-71. 
Nee, Victor. 1989. “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in  
State Socialism.” American Sociological Review 54(5):663-681. 
Nee, Victor and Sonja Opper. Forthcoming. Entrepreneurial Action: Market  
Transition, Property Rights and Innovation in China. Journal of Institutional  
and Theoretical Economics.  
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghuram Rajan. 1994. “The Benefits of Lending  
Relationships:  Evidence from Small Business Data.” Journal of Finance  
49(1):3-37. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A  
Resource Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper & Row. 
Powell, Walter W. and Jason Owen-Smith. 1998. “Universities and the Market for  
 Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences.” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
 Management  17(2):253-77. 
 29 
Powell, Walter W.; Kenneth Koput; and Laurel Smith-Doerr. 1996.  
“Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of  
Learning in Biotechnology.” Administrative Science Quarterly 41:116-45. 
Rauch, James E. 2001. “Business and Social Networks in International Trade.”  
Journal of Economic Literature 39:1177-1203. 
Scott, W. Richard. 1991. “Unpacking Institutional Arguments.” In The New  
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Ed. by Powell and DiMaggio. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, pp. 164-182.  
Singh, Jitendra, David Tucker, and Agnes Meinhard. 1991. “Institutional Change and  
Ecological Dynamics.” In The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Ed. By Powell and DiMaggio. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 
390- 422. 
Singh, Jitendra, David Tucker, and Robert House. 1986. “Organizational Legitimacy  
and the Liability of Newness.” Administrative Science Quarterly. 31:171-93. 
Smith-Doerr, Laurel and Walter W. Powell. 2005. “Networks and Economic Life.”  
The Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2nd ed. Smelser and Swedberg, eds.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 379-402. 
Steinfeld, Edward S. 2002. “Moving Beyond Transition in China: Financial Reform  
and the Political Economy of Declining Growth.” Comparative Politics.  
34(4):379-98. 
Stearns, Linda Brewster and Mark S. Mizruchi. “Banking and Financial Markets.” The  
 Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2nd ed. Smelser and Swedberg, eds.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 284-306. 
Stuart, Toby E. 1998. “Network Positions and Propensities to Collaborate: An  
Investigation of Strategic Alliance Formation in a High-Technology Industry.”  
Administrative Science Quarterly 43(3):668-98. 
 30 
Stuart, Toby E. 2000. “Interorganizational Alliances and the Performance of Firms: A  
Study of Growth and Innovation Rates in a High-Technology Industry.”  
Strategic Management Journal 21(8):791-811. 
Stuart, Toby, Ha Hoang and Ralph Hybels. 1999. “Interorganizational Endorsements  
and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Ventures.” Administrative Science  
Quarterly 44:315-49.  
Uzzi, Brian. 1996. “The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the  
Economic Performance of Organizations.” American Sociological Review  
61:674-98. 
Uzzi, Brian. 1999. “Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social  
Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing.” American 
Sociological Review 64:481-505. 
Walder, Andrew G. 1995. “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational  
 Analysis of China’s Transitional Economy.” American Journal of Sociology  
101(2):263-301. 
Zuckerman, Ezra W. 1999. “The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the  
Illegitimacy Discount.” American Journal of Sociology 104:1398-1438. 
 
